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**30 for 2025 | North America**

# Quality Stocks for a Long-Term Holding Period

As we contemplate the end of this bear market, we refresh a cornerstone Morgan Stanley analysis, '30 for 2025': Our best long-term picks based on the sustainability and quality of the business model, and opportunity to widen their competitive advantage.

**Our view remains that the current bear market is not over.** We expect earnings to drop well below consensus expectations, with our base case for 2023 at \$195. We believe this will be followed by a stronger earnings picture in 2024.

**That said, we have also identified potential cyclical and secular drivers of the next bull market in equities,** including more accommodative monetary policy as inflation slows; a more stable starting point for consumer balance sheets; pent-up demand in investment / capex and in certain parts of consumer services; a global growth recovery led by economies that have lagged since the pandemic; the reemergence of positive operating leverage; Artificial Intelligence and its diffusion across sectors; and reshoring.

**So, which stocks should investors focus on as we contemplate an end to this bear market? '30 for 2025' identifies our best long-term picks.** Our work has long supported the view that quality outperforms in the long run. Accordingly, we asked each of our US analysts to identify the highest-quality companies in their sectors, the ones likely to strengthen their sustainable competitive advantage. This report highlights 30 companies that look especially well positioned.

**The main criterion is sustainability — of competitive advantage, business model, pricing power, cost efficiency, and growth.** From more than 50 companies singled out by our analysts, we narrowed our focus to those that stood out on these criteria. We paid particular attention to RNOA, management's strategy, capital structure, and shareholder remuneration (dividends / buybacks). We also examined each stock's scores in our Quant Strategy team's stock selection models. Additionally, we integrated Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors into our decision process, and assessed key risks and opportunities for each company.

**We sought to identify the best franchises, not the most undervalued stocks.** There was no prerequisite that they be rated Overweight, and we were largely agnostic about their valuations. Our guiding principle was to create a list of companies whose business models and market positions would be increasingly differentiated into 2025.

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**Alphabet**  
**American Express**  
**Blackstone**  
**Cheniere Energy**  
**Costco Wholesale**  
**Eaton**  
**Eli Lilly**  
**Estee Lauder**  
**Exxon Mobil**  
**Hilton Worldwide**  
**Intuitive Surgical**  
**JPMorgan Chase**  
**Liberty Formula One**  
**Linde**  
**Lululemon Athletica**  
**MasterCard**  
**Microsoft**  
**Motorola Solutions**  
**MSCI Inc.**  
**NextEra Energy**  
**Nike**  
**Northrop Grumman**  
**Old Dominion Freight Line**  
**Prologis**  
**Raytheon Technologies**  
**Thermo Fisher Scientific**  
**T-Mobile US**  
**UnitedHealth Group**  
**Visa**  
**Yum! Brands**

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For analyst certification and other important disclosures, refer to the Disclosure Section, located at the end of this report.

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
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# Our Analysts' Assessments



Source: Morgan Stanley Research



# Financial Metrics

Exhibit 1: Financial Metrics

Ticker	Company	GICS Sector	Analyst	Survey Score	Market Cap	Revenue	EPS	EBIT Margin (%)		RNOA (%)		Net Debt / EBITDA	Interest Cover
						5-Yr CAGR ('20-25e)	5-Yr CAGR ('20-25e)	2023e	2025e	2023e	2025e	2023e	2023e
GOOGL.O	Alphabet Inc.	Communication Services	Nowak, Brian	48	1,306,460	17%	23%	27.4% e	28.5% e	54.3% e	61.7% e	NM	NM
AXP.N	American Express Company	Financials	Graseck, Betsy	46	116,461	15%	32%	NM	NM	33.8% e	34.4% e	NM	NM
BX.N	Blackstone Inc.	Financials	Cyprys, Michael	48	103,369	22%	22%	58.7% e	60.9% e	35.2% e	49.0% e	1.4 e	55.1x
LNG.A	Cheniere Energy Inc	Energy	McDermott, Devin	44	35,062	19%	65%	36.9% e	28.7% e	26.5% e	22.1% e	2.2 e	5.1x
COST.O	Costco Wholesale Corp	Consumer Staples	Gutman, Simeon	39	215,998	10%	14%	3.5% e	3.5% e	29.5% e	30.7% e	NM	NM
ETN.N	Eaton Corporation PLC	Industrials	Pokrzywinski, Joshua	46	63,822	7%	16%	18.7% e	19.6% e	10.8% e	13.3% e	1.3 e	21.0x
LLY.N	Eli Lilly & Co.	Health Care	Flynn, Terence	42	313,494	11%	15%	30.5% e	40.3% e	35.2% e	55.2% e	1.3 e	68.0x
EL.N	Estee Lauder Companies Inc	Consumer Staples	Mohsenian, Dara	48	83,790	8%	17%	15.3% e	19.8% e	24.6% e	36.2% e	0.7 e	21.8x
XOM.N	Exxon Mobil Corporation	Energy	McDermott, Devin	45	406,447	15%	NM	15.6% e	10.5% e	23.5% e	15.8% e	NM	91.2x
HLT.N	Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc	Consumer Discretionary	Grambling, Stephen	46	36,381	22%	141%	25.6% e	26.0% e	27.7% e	32.8% e	2.7 e	6.0x
ISRG.O	Intuitive Surgical Inc.	Health Care	Ranieri, Drew	41	83,291	14%	15%	33.4% e	35.2% e	37.7% e	44.6% e	NM	NM
JPM.N	JPMorgan Chase & Co	Financials	Graseck, Betsy	50	370,304	5%	12%	NM	NM	15.2% e	14.0% e	NM	NM
FWONK.O	Liberty Formula One	Communication Services	Swinburne, Benjamin	46	17,388	28%	NM	10.1% e	13.6% e	7.1% e	8.5% e	1.5 e	1.9x
LIN.N	Linde PLC	Materials	Andrews, Vincent	47	162,654	6%	15%	25.3% e	27.6% e	11.9% e	13.5% e	1.3 e	42.5x
LULU.O	Lululemon Athletica Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Straton, Alex	39	37,609	22%	28%	23.1% e	24.0% e	65.9% e	77.5% e	NM	NM
MA.N	MasterCard Inc	Information Technology	Faucette, James	47	333,311	16%	21%	58.1% e	59.1% e	78.9% e	128.4% e	0.1 e	36.0x
MSFT.O	Microsoft	Information Technology	Weiss, Keith	45	2,080,022	14%	18%	41.5% e	43.8% e	64.7% e	65.8% e	NM	NM
MSLN	Motorola Solutions Inc	Information Technology	Marshall, Meta	39	44,194	8%	12%	27.1% e	29.4% e	40.5% e	46.4% e	1.4 e	11.5x
MSCI.N	MSCI Inc.	Financials	Kaplan, Toni	47	43,001	13%	19%	55.1% e	57.2% e	46.0% e	63.5% e	2.4 e	8.5x
NEE.N	NextEra Energy Inc	Utilities	Arcaro, David	48	150,394	11%	10%	32.2% e	35.0% e	6.5% e	6.7% e	5.1 e	3.2x
NKE.N	Nike Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Straton, Alex	45	186,672	9%	13%	13.1% e	16.3% e	38.4% e	40.6% e	0.0 e	NM
NOC.N	Northrop Grumman Corp.	Industrials	Liwag, Kristine	48	67,894	4%	5%	10.6% e	11.8% e	12.4% e	15.1% e	1.9 e	7.0x
ODFL.O	Old Dominion Freight Line Inc	Industrials	Shanker, Ravi	49	36,480	12%	21%	29.0% e	30.0% e	38.1% e	37.1% e	NM	920.5x
PLD.N	Prologis, Inc.	Real Estate	Kamdern, Ronald	55	107,145	14%	10%	40.1% e	39.5% e	4.2% e	4.7% e	3.8 e	5.3x
RTX.N	Raytheon Technologies Corp	Industrials	Liwag, Kristine	43	140,102	5%	17%	12.1% e	13.4% e	6.5% e	8.4% e	2.3 e	6.1x
TMO.N	Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	Health Care	Savant, Tejas	49	210,961	10%	9%	23.9% e	24.9% e	13.6% e	16.0% e	1.9 e	22.5x
TMUS.O	T-Mobile US, Inc.	Communication Services	Flannery, Simon	44	173,701	5%	35%	20.4% e	24.1% e	8.7% e	10.7% e	2.5 e	4.9x
UNH.N	UnitedHealth Group Inc	Health Care	Wright, Erin	48	437,971	11%	14%	8.9% e	9.4% e	26.3% e	35.3% e	0.5 e	11.3x
V.N	Visa Inc.	Information Technology	Faucette, James	47	447,433	13%	17%	67.9% e	69.2% e	37.2% e	41.6% e	NM	145.0x
YUM.N	Yum! Brands, Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Harbour, Brian	46	35,532	8%	13%	32.8% e	34.2% e	74.4% e	88.1% e	4.9 e	4.3x

Source: Morgan Stanley Research ModelWare.

Share prices as of March 17th.

Metrics are calculated using the 'for consensus' methodology.

NA = Not Applicable; NM = Not Meaningful

For PLD.N: Numbers in EPS column represent FFO per share.

For BX.N, AXP.N, and JPM.N: Numbers in RNOA column represent ROE numbers.

# Valuation Metrics


Exhibit 2: Valuation Metrics

Ticker	Company	GICS Sector	Analyst	Fiscal Year End	Price	P/E	EV/EBIT	FCF Yld	Div Yld	12-18 month upside/downside to			Risk-Reward Values			
										Base / PT	Bull	Bear	Bull	Bear	Base	PT
GOOGL.O	Alphabet Inc.	Communication Services	Nowak, Brian	Dec	101.62	18.0 e	13.4 e	10.5% e	NA	33%	72%	-16%	175.00	85.00	135.00	135.00
AXP.N	American Express Company	Financials	Graseck, Betsy	Dec	156.52	13.8 e	NM	NA	1.5% e	19%	47%	-23%	230.00	120.00	186.00	186.00
BX.N	Blackstone Inc.	Financials	Cyprys, Michael	Dec	84.89	20.9 e	19.5 e	5.4% e	4.1% e	35%	93%	-43%	164.00	48.00	115.00	115.00
LNG.A	Cheniere Energy Inc	Energy	McDermott, Devin	Dec	143.87	7.5 e	7.6 e	3.8% e	1.2% e	31%	87%	-5%	269.00	137.00	189.00	189.00
COST.O	Costco Wholesale Corp	Consumer Staples	Gutman, Simeon	Aug	487.05	34.2 e	25.1 e	3.2% e	0.8% e	7%	42%	-28%	690.00	350.00	520.00	520.00
ETN.N	Eaton Corporation PLC	Industrials	Pokrzywinski, Joshua	Dec	160.15	19.2 e	16.7 e	5.9% e	2.0% e	25%	56%	-6%	250.00	150.00	200.00	200.00
LLY.N	Eli Lilly & Co.	Health Care	Flynn, Terence	Dec	329.18	36.8 e	33.2 e	2.1% e	1.4% e	35%	72%	-37%	566.00	209.00	444.00	444.00
EL.N	Estee Lauder Companies Inc	Consumer Staples	Mohsenian, Dara	Jun	234.56	45.5 e	33.1 e	1.5% e	1.1% e	20%	56%	-10%	366.00	212.00	281.00	281.00
XOM.N	Exxon Mobil Corporation	Energy	McDermott, Devin	Dec	99.84	9.9 e	6.4 e	11.0% e	3.7% e	14%	40%	-26%	140.00	74.00	114.00	114.00
HLT.N	Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc	Consumer Discretionary	Grambling, Stephen	Dec	136.54	21.9 e	16.6 e	5.3% e	0.7% e	23%	56%	-30%	213.00	96.00	168.00	168.00
ISRG.O	Intuitive Surgical Inc.	Health Care	Ranieri, Drew	Dec	237.80	45.1 e	35.2 e	2.1% e	NA	11%	26%	-9%	300.00	216.00	265.00	265.00
JPM.N	JPMorgan Chase & Co	Financials	Graseck, Betsy	Dec	125.81	8.7 e	NM	NA	3.3% e	38%	57%	-13%	197.00	110.00	173.00	173.00
FWONK.O	Liberty Formula One	Communication Services	Swinburne, Benjamin	Dec	71.65	130.3 e	53.6 e	1.0% e	0.0% e	12%	26%	-30%	90.00	50.00	80.00	80.00
LIN.N	Linde PLC	Materials	Andrews, Vincent	Dec	330.49	24.7 e	20.8 e	3.1% e	1.5% e	10%	30%	-24%	430.00	250.00	365.00	365.00
LULU.O	Lululemon Athletica Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Straton, Alex	Jan	294.74	25.0 e	16.2 e	4.4% e	0.0% e	31%	130%	-59%	678.00	122.00	387.00	387.00
MA.N	MasterCard Inc	Information Technology	Faucette, James	Dec	349.66	28.5 e	22.8 e	3.8% e	0.7% e	25%	66%	-39%	580.00	214.00	438.00	438.00
MSFT.O	Microsoft	Information Technology	Weiss, Keith	Jun	279.43	29.6 e	23.1 e	3.2% e	1.0% e	10%	35%	-35%	376.00	181.00	307.00	307.00
MSI.N	Motorola Solutions Inc	Information Technology	Marshall, Meta	Dec	264.24	23.7 e	19.3 e	3.7% e	1.0% e	-2%	23%	-32%	325.00	180.00	260.00	260.00
MSCI.N	MSCI Inc.	Financials	Kaplan, Toni	Dec	537.09	40.3 e	33.3 e	2.6% e	1.1% e	1%	29%	-28%	692.00	385.00	543.00	543.00
NEE.N	NextEra Energy Inc	Utilities	Arcaro, David	Dec	75.67	24.4 e	26.3 e	(2.6%) e	2.5% e	28%	39%	-22%	105.00	59.00	97.00	97.00
NKE.N	Nike Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Straton, Alex	May	120.39	29.7 e	24.5 e	2.3% e	1.2% e	16%	85%	-40%	223.00	72.00	140.00	140.00
NOC.N	Northrop Grumman Corp.	Industrials	Liwag, Kristine	Dec	443.60	20.0 e	18.9 e	3.0% e	1.6% e	35%	72%	-23%	762.00	341.00	601.00	601.00
ODFL.O	Old Dominion Freight Line Inc	Industrials	Shanker, Ravi	Dec	331.56	27.2 e	19.8 e	2.5% e	0.4% e	3%	25%	-17%	415.00	275.00	340.00	340.00
PLD.N	Prologis, Inc.	Real Estate	Kamdem, Ronald	Dec	116.03	21.2	22.0 e	3.8% e	3.0% e	10%	22%	-34%	141.00	76.00	128.00	128.00
RTX.N	Raytheon Technologies Corp	Industrials	Liwag, Kristine	Dec	95.75	19.1 e	19.1 e	3.5% e	2.3% e	20%	97%	-32%	189.00	65.00	115.00	115.00
TMO.N	Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	Health Care	Savant, Tejas	Dec	547.34	23.1 e	22.3 e	4.3% e	0.3% e	22%	35%	-6%	739.00	513.00	670.00	670.00
TMUS.O	T-Mobile US, Inc.	Communication Services	Flannery, Simon	Dec	142.45	20.2 e	14.4 e	7.7% e	NA	23%	61%	-26%	230.00	105.00	175.00	175.00
UNH.N	UnitedHealth Group Inc	Health Care	Wright, Erin	Dec	469.50	18.6 e	14.0 e	6.3% e	1.4% e	25%	94%	-47%	909.00	249.00	587.00	587.00
V.N	Visa Inc.	Information Technology	Faucette, James	Sep	217.39	25.4 e	20.7 e	3.8% e	0.8% e	32%	61%	-32%	351.00	148.00	288.00	288.00
YUM.N	Yum! Brands, Inc.	Consumer Discretionary	Harbour, Brian	Dec	126.85	25.2 e	19.9 e	3.7% e	1.9% e	22%	41%	-16%	179.00	107.00	155.00	155.00


Source: Morgan Stanley Research ModelWare.  
 Share prices as of March 17th.  
 Metrics are calculated using the 'for consensus' methodology.  
 NA = Not Applicable; NM = Not Meaningful  
 For PLD.N: Numbers in P/E column represent P/FFO per share.  
 For PLD.N: Numbers in EV/EBIT column represent EV/EBITDA.

# Alphabet (GOOGL)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Alphabet Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Alphabet Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						21.0%	20.3%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	14.6%						18.2%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						54.3%	28.2%
EBIT margin				27.4%			7.8%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E	18.0x						18.3x
EV/EBIT	13.4x						16.9x
P/FCF			9.7x				23.5x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA							

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Internet Industry View: In-Line

Brian Nowak

**The Digital Transformation continues to accelerate, AI is the next internet opportunity, and there is still a large addressable market...** Behavior shifts seen throughout the pandemic impacted the way consumers live and businesses communicate with consumers and we continue to see an acceleration of this digital transformation in the post-Covid era. This, combined with the AI opportunity, highlights the importance of some of GOOGL's key products and investment areas.

**... And GOOGL's product portfolio is well positioned to benefit from key trends.** We continue to see runway from here for GOOGL's core product offering including Search, YouTube and Cloud and highlight the significant incremental Search revenue and share price potential as we see next generations of AI-driven search leading to higher relevancy/completeness, a further collapsing of the shopping funnel (people effectively visiting fewer sites) and higher user conversion. For YouTube, the platform continues to evolve with Shorts and we see generative AI (content creation tools) and improved algorithm matching & advertising attribution as a potential tailwind to engagement and revenue growth. Lastly, on Cloud, we see next generation AI tools driving more durable multi-year public cloud adoption.

**We also remain confident GOOGL faces more manageable incremental costs.** We see management focused on durably reengineering the cost base and see GOOGL working to improve AI compute cost efficiency at the infrastructure, model and application layer, which builds confidence that margins won't compress over the long term.


Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$135






# American Express (AXP)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Equity (ROE) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

American Express Company vs. Sector Peers

	American Express Company					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	15.2%					8.0%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	9.2%					3.8%
<b>Returns</b>						
ROE	33.8%					12.7%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E	13.8x					7.6x
P/B	4.3x					0.8x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e. (P/B could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Consumer Finance Industry View: Cautious

Betsy Graseck

**Higher credit-quality skew offers downside protection from consumer credit deterioration.** AXP's card book is high quality, with subprime loans estimated to be 5-10% of loans. We are more concerned about credit deterioration at more heavily subprime-exposed card issuers, including Underweight-rated COF (31%) and SYF (26%). As broader consumer credit quality continues worsening from here amid declining savings and high inflation, we expect AXP's card losses and delinquencies to only *return* to pre-Covid levels by YE24, while card peers are expected to overshoot.

**Post-Covid recovery tailwinds provide opportunity for sustainable topline growth...** AXP is well positioned to benefit from ongoing recovery in corporate T&E spend - still running 34% below 2019 levels. On the consumer end, we think AXP's higher-income cardholders will have an easier time managing this high-inflationary period. We see this card spend resiliency translating to a ~16% 2022-2025 CAGR in AXP's card fee income, and strong loan growth from its customer base. We expect this to drive a ~11% 2022-2025 CAGR in total revenues.


**...creating a path for positive operating leverage.** Bears typically point to Amex's lack of operating leverage, weighed down by high variable expenses (i.e. card member rewards). Our forecast for slowing growth in marketing and cardmember acquisition expenses should help drive ~430bp operating leverage growth in 2023, its highest in over a decade and a standout among card peers. We expect positive operating leverage growth can continue into 2024 as well, even as top-line growth cools.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$186




# Blackstone (BX)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Equity (ROE) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Blackstone Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Blackstone Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	[Bar chart]					31.5%	14.0%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	[Bar chart]					30.3%	9.1%
<b>Returns</b>							
ROE	[Bar chart]					35.2%	18.9%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E	[Bar chart]					20.9x	16.1x
P/B	[Bar chart]					11.4x	2.6x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e. (P/B could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Brokers, Asset Managers & Exchanges Ind. View: In-Line

Michael Cyprys

**Blackstone is a leading private markets franchise with a best-in-class brand, unrivalled product capabilities, and distribution breadth**, in our view. BX is increasingly focused on expanding its TAM, extending into new verticals, and boosting margins. This should drive sustainable growth higher than the market appreciates and support a premium valuation.

**Compelling secular grower at an attractive price.** We see powerful secular tailwinds driving increased allocations to private markets including a ~\$70tr retail TAM that's still in early days of penetration, a large opportunity set of investable assets, new growth engines, and private markets' strong track record versus public markets through cycles. Against this backdrop, we view BX as best positioned to capture outsized share of a growing pie, particularly as asset-owner clients and retail platforms target a narrower set of managers with a breadth of offerings. In retail, BX is furthest along with a first-mover advantage and industry-leading distribution capabilities.

**Focus on firepower and staying power.** BX's long-duration locked-up capital, ramping permanent capital initiatives, and over \$187b of dry powder should enable the company to patiently wait for opportunities to time exits and deployment. We believe this yields significant firepower and staying power, which, combined with an enviable brand, should enable BX to navigate through cycles and support the next wave of growth.


Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$115






# Cheniere Energy (LNG)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Cheniere Energy Inc vs. Sector Peers

	Cheniere Energy Inc					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					-9.3%	-15.2%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					7.6%	-6.0%
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA					26.5%	21.4%
EBIT margin			36.9%			32.8%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E				7.5x		6.6x
EV/EBIT					7.6x	5.3x
P/FCF					26.3x	6.8x
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA					2.2x	0.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Diversified Natural Gas Industry View: In-Line

Devin McDermott

**LNG market leader.** Cheniere remains the dominant LNG player in the US and in our view is structurally advantaged compared to smaller, independent US peers given its scale, low-cost expansion opportunities, and existing platform of resilient cash flows backed by long-term contracts. ~95% of the company's liquefaction capacity is sold under fixed-price sales agreements through 2030, supporting stable cash flow regardless of where LNG prices go (weighted average contract life of 17 years).

**Pathways for growth.** Cheniere is currently progressing its brownfield expansion project at Corpus Christi Stage 3, set to come online in late 2025. Longer term, the company plans to formally file with FERC for Corpus Christi Midscale Trains 8 & 9 by the end of 1Q and recently pre-filed for a large 20+ mtpa expansion at Sabine Pass. Together with additional growth projects, Cheniere sees the potential for ~90 mtpa of total liquefaction capacity (from 45 mtpa today).


**Attractive macro supports strong FCF and shareholder returns.** Cheniere is well-positioned to benefit from the ongoing tightness in global gas markets through strong marketing margins and additional growth opportunities. At \$10 JKM (Asia LNG), \$3.25 Henry Hub, and conservative \$3.50 marketing margins, we forecast run-rate distributable cash flow of ~\$24/sh, a 16% yield on the current stock price. Over the next several years, resilient FCF should support declining leverage, growing dividends, and share repurchases. Cheniere's attractive shareholder returns strategy includes 10% annual dividend growth and MSe \$2B of share buybacks in 2023.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$189




# Costco Wholesale (COST)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Costco Wholesale Corp vs. Sector Peers

	Costco Wholesale Corp	Peer median
Growth		
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	7.8%	9.3%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	6.2%	4.1%
Returns		
RNOA	29.5%	12.7%
EBIT margin	3.5%	4.0%
Valuation		
P/E	34.2x	19.3x
EV/EBIT	25.1x	16.9x
P/FCF	31.7x	19.5x
Leverage		
Net Debt/EBITDA		1.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Hardline/Broadline/Food Retail Industry View: In-Line

Simeon Gutman

**One of the best companies in all of Retail**, in our view. COST's differentiated value proposition and the stability of the club model set it apart. In contrast to most retailers, customers pay COST for the right to shop in their stores. That this model continues to work is borne out by strong membership renewal rates (average of ~89% over the past 5 years, and a record ~90.5% in the most recent quarter). We believe Covid, inflationary pressures on the consumer, and gas price volatility have strengthened COST's value proposition, with likely higher membership stickiness and spending consolidation at COST relative to past years.

**Private label offers differentiation.** We estimate COST's private label brand, Kirkland Signature, has grown to >\$75b in revenue (~35% of total net sales in F22). This lifts COST's margins (we estimate PL products carry a 1,000 bps gross margin advantage over branded ones) and protects its position as a retailer with products found nowhere else.


**3 long-term drivers for the stock:** (1) We model a ~2.5% CAGR in the club base through F25; we see room for at least 100 more US warehouses (~10 years of domestic growth), plus >50 potential international warehouses over the long term. (2) SSS should continue to grow at a mid-single digit rate, driven by merchandising, consumables, and eComm. (3) Membership & fee income growth should continue at ~3%/~8% respectively (their 5-yr averages) as consumers look to access COST's unique value proposition; we see potential upside as we believe a membership fee increase likely in the next 12 months. Alongside stable/steady EBIT margins, this also drives our LT outlook for mid- to- high-single-digit sales, EBIT, and EPS growth.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$520




# Eaton (ETN)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Eaton Corporation PLC vs. Sector Peers

	Eaton Corporation PLC percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						10.4%	9.7%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						6.2%	4.6%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA	10.8%						12.7%
EBIT margin						18.7%	17.2%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E				19.2x			19.4x
EV/EBIT						16.7x	14.7x
P/FCF				17.2x			19.7x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA				1.3x			1.3x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Multi-Industry Industry View: In-Line

Joshua Pokrzywinski

**We believe ETN is uniquely positioned with best-in-class near-term visibility and long-term growth.**

**Backlog visibility isn't just high, it's exceptional.** ETN's backlog within its electrical businesses is running 2x higher than "normal" levels, with close to 60% NTM revenue coverage. We estimate that orders can decline by 20%+ and still enter 2025 with above normal visibility / backlog coverage. With attention turning to the cycle amid a weakening macro backdrop, we expect ETN's backlog coverage supports better near-term visibility than most while also having some of the best long-term growth drivers in our coverage.


**The multiple vectors of energy transition go through electrical equipment, which are key pieces of infrastructure to enable electrification.** ETN is ~70% electrical exposed with leading positions in the US low- and medium-voltage electrical market (~30%+ market share). This is a consolidated industry with strong pricing power using proven technology required to connect and control all manner of electric sources, uses, and storage. Electrification is already showing up in macro data with electrical growth accelerating to MSD+ over the past two years and should drive continued M-HSD growth through 2030. Stimulus, nearshoring, and backlog conversion likely drive this closer to HSD over the next few years.

## Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$200




# Eli Lilly (LLY)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Eli Lilly & Co. vs. Sector Peers

	Eli Lilly & Co.					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						33.8%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						16.9%
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA						30.6%
EBIT margin						30.3%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E						11.9x
EV/EBIT						11.9x
P/FCF						7.0x
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA						1.2x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Terence Flynn

### Robust new product cycles and limited exposure to loss of exclusivity (LOE) favorably position LLY within US Pharma.

The company could potentially launch five new products across four large therapeutic areas by the end of 2023, including obesity. Trulicity goes off patent later this decade, but the company should be able to transition the franchise to Mounjaro.

### We expect Mounjaro uptake in type-2 diabetes (T2D) and expected approval in obesity to drive top-line growth and margin expansion through the decade.

LLY is positioned to grow revenue at a 10% CAGR from '23-'30 which should expand margins from 28% in 2022 to >40% in 2025+, driving EPS growth of 18%, on our estimates. This compares favorably to the rest of the peer group.

### LLY is well positioned to capture significant share in a new therapeutic TAM.

LLY currently splits the GLP-1 injectable T2D market with Novo (covered by Mark Purcell). Both companies are competitively positioned to retain a duopoly as this category of drugs moves into obesity, which we project as a \$50bn+ opportunity. Mounjaro's efficacy profile in both T2D and obesity will make it a share gainer in the expanding class. LLY is also developing additional drugs for T2D and obesity, which position the company to remain competitive in these areas longer term.

### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$444




Major Pharmaceuticals Industry View: In-Line




# Estée Lauder (EL)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Estee Lauder Companies Inc vs. Sector Peers

	Estee Lauder Companies Inc percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						31.1%	14.3%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					10.5%		5.2%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA				24.6%			22.7%
EBIT margin	15.3%						19.2%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E						45.5x	29.1x
EV/EBIT						33.1x	21.1x
P/FCF						66.8x	31.4x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA	0.7x						1.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Dara Mohsenian

**EL is well positioned in prestige beauty with strong category and geographic growth trends and mix shifts, opportunities for meaningful margin expansion, and best-in-class management**, in our view.

**Post-Covid Beauty Rebound.** We are confident in the sustainability of the post-Covid beauty rebound, with long-term prestige beauty category growth in the HSD% range, with continued premiumization, a growing middle class emerging in emerging markets, a larger pie post-Covid for travel retail with Hainan development, and continued e-commerce strength with technological advancements.

**Growth and Margin Expansion Opportunity.** EL has benefited from a long-term mix shift to higher growth and higher margin areas (China, travel retail, e-commerce, and skin care) that have been artificially depressed by Covid and should re-emerge as a key investment thesis recovering to its LT growth algorithm.

**Consensus Assumes L-MSD% Growth.** Consensus only forecasts 3-4% revenue CAGR's vs. a pre-Covid period looking out over the next two years, seemingly too low if China fully recovers relative to outsized MSD-HSD LT prestige beauty category growth (to which EL is 100% exposed).


Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$281




Household & Personal Care Industry View: In-Line

# Exxon Mobil (XOM)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Exxon Mobil Corporation vs. Sector Peers

	Exxon Mobil Corporation					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				-15.6%		
Sales '23-'25 CAGR				-3.4%		
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA				23.5%		
EBIT margin	15.6%					
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E					9.9x	6.6x
EV/EBIT				6.4x		5.3x
P/FCF					9.3x	6.8x
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA						0.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Integrated Energy Industry View: Attractive

Devin McDermott

**Competitive positioning.** XOM's strong FCF profile is supported by an advantaged portfolio of high return growth projects. These investments, coupled with ongoing execution on >\$9B of cost cuts (\$6.9B to date with an additional ~\$2B through 2023), should allow the company to double earnings capacity by 2027 (vs. 2019). Robust FCF supports ~300% dividend cover in 2023 and ~\$35B of share repurchases across 2023-24. In total, XOM offers a ~8% 2023 shareholder return yield (~\$85/bbl WTI), with the potential for further upside.

**Low-carbon opportunities.** XOM is also an industry leader in decarbonization, focusing on technologies that are synergistic with core competencies including carbon capture & storage (CCS), hydrogen, and renewable fuels. The company has cumulatively captured more carbon than any company (40% of the global total) and has a near-term pipeline of ~20 CCS projects. Moreover, XOM is advancing a blue hydrogen plant in the US Gulf Coast and targeting ~200 kbb/d of lower-emission fuels production by 2030. We forecast a 15% average return on capital will deliver ~\$4B in low-carbon earnings by 2030 and ~\$8B by 2035.


**Sustainable long-term growth.** XOM's diversified business, resilient FCF, and strong balance sheet support continued investments in high return opportunities across the Energy value chain. In addition to benefitting from what we expect to be a multi-year period of strong oil & gas prices, XOM's proactive (but still returns focused) decarbonization strategy should help de-risk longer term cash flows and mitigate terminal value uncertainty – offsetting the impact of longer-term erosion in oil & gas demand.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$114




# Hilton Worldwide (HLT)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc vs. Sector Peers

	Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR			14.3%				17.9%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR			5.8%				6.2%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						27.7%	13.1%
EBIT margin						25.6%	16.4%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E			21.9x				20.9x
EV/EBIT			16.6x				16.6x
P/FCF				20.2x			16.1x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA			2.7x				2.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Gaming & Lodging Industry View: In-Line

Stephen Grambling, CFA

**HLT is poised to benefit from secular growth of travel and gain share all within a capital-light model with a best-in-class management team.**

**Beneficiary of long-term demand trends:** We expect lodging to continue to grow above GDP: (1) rising consumer incomes = higher share of spend on travel; and (2) shifts from industrial to service based economies = higher corporate travel. HLT's scale also creates more efficient distribution and higher revenue for hotel owners, enabling share gains from independent and sub-scale peers.

**HLT's asset light model limits volatility, maximizes ROIC.**

HLT generates >85% of EBITDA from fees, which are largely tied to the top line of hotels rather than profitability. When combined with limited G&A and capex, HLT has highly visible fundamentals. During the pandemic, EBITDA declined less than revenue and FCF stayed positive.


**FCF Compounder:** With one of the highest in-construction pipelines (18% growth vs. current), we expect the company to deliver 5%+ growth over the next three years (with new "Spark" brand offering potential for 6-7%). Therefore, even if RevPAR growth is modest, room growth should propel EPS at 20%+ and FCF 15%+ from 2022-24. Note the company's growth and margins are understated in our metrics table due to reimbursed revenue. Excluding these, HLT's 2020-2025 revenue CAGR is 24% and 2023/2025 EBIT margins are 61%/64%, pushing the company even further up the rankings.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$168




# Intuitive Surgical (ISRG)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Intuitive Surgical Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Intuitive Surgical Inc.					Peer median	
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				12.8%			12.8%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						11.3%	6.2%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						37.7%	9.9%
EBIT margin						33.4%	24.2%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E						45.1x	25.2x
EV/EBIT						35.2x	19.6x
P/FCF						47.9x	32.3x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA							1.4x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Medical Technology Industry View: In-Line

Drew Ranieri

### One of the most innovative companies in Medical Technology.

We see Intuitive as a best-in-class enabler of minimally invasive surgical innovation with a broad portfolio of robotic surgery technology. Intuitive has the dominant market position, though competitive systems are in early innings. Still, we believe Intuitive's substantial global installed base (>7,500 systems), large active (and trained) surgeon base, and building ecosystem will entrench the company's dominant position for years to come. We see potentially open-ended opportunities to augment robotic systems by developing digital capabilities and data insights, which could further enhance Intuitive's offering and likely provide stickier market share positioning.

### A large and growing TAM that we think remains under-penetrated.

Worldwide robotics surgery penetration stands at 5-6% after multiple decades on the market. Over 1.8mn procedures were performed worldwide on Intuitive's da Vinci systems in '22 ('17-'22 CAGR: 16%). Based on existing clinical applications and geographies, the company has line of sight to 6mn procedures, with opportunities to 4x the market size with new technologies, indications and entry into new geographies over time. Newer platforms (Ion and SP) open access to additional markets and procedures. Hospitals are increasingly establishing robotics programs, and standardizing practices around Intuitive's technology and building additional robotic procedure capacity.


### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$265






# JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Equity (ROE) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

	JPMorgan Chase & Co	Peer median
<b>Growth</b>		
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	5.2%	8.0%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	3.3%	3.8%
<b>Returns</b>		
ROE	15.2%	12.7%
<b>Valuation</b>		
P/E	8.7x	7.6x
P/B	1.3x	0.8x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e. (P/B could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Large Cap Banks Industry View: In-Line

Betsy Graseck

**Positive operating leverage in 2023.** We model JPM delivering 400bps of positive operating leverage in 2023, with revenues up 12% and expenses up 8% y/y. This is a significant inflection from the last two years of negative operating leverage at JPM (-510bps in 2021, -40bps in 2022). In addition, while Jamie Dimon has made it clear that he believes in investing through a cycle as reflected in JPM's industry leading \$14.1B tech budget, we think risks around expenses skew positively. Areas to pull back on expenses include low priority projects, market-related revenues in the custody business, opportunities to flex on mortgage-related expenses, and revenue-related comp in the Corporate & Institutional Bank.

**Consumer & Community Bank (CCB) is taking deposit share.** JPM is taking deposit share across the country with median deposit share up 1.5% across the Top 50 US MSAs over the last 5 years and median 3.1% across the Top 25 US MSAs. This reflects JPM executing on 500 new branch builds since 2017 including 300 branches in new markets including Boston, DC, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and Baltimore, with the goal of becoming a scale player (we think ~10% or greater share) in each of these markets. We think JPM should continue to take share as 20% of its branch network is <10 years old, significantly higher than industry average of 12% and big bank average of mid-single digits.


**JPM de-rates less than peers in recessions.** Looking at the last four recessions (2001-02, 2008-10, 2016 recession fears, 2020), JPM's NTM Consensus PE troughed at 7.5-9.2x, above BAC's trough range of 6.1-9.2x and Citi's of 4.3-7.5x.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$173




# Liberty Formula One (FWONK)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

Liberty Formula One vs. Sector Peers

	Liberty Formula One					Peer median	
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						69.2%	13.0%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					6.6%		5.2%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA				7.1%			9.4%
EBIT margin				10.1%			10.0%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E						130.3x	17.6x
EV/EBIT						53.6x	18.2x
P/FCF						98.7x	14.2x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA			1.5x				3.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Media & Entertainment Industry View: In-Line

Benjamin Swinburne

**Investment Outlook:** Our Overweight on FWONK reflects (1) our bullish view on sports as an asset class, (2) F1's rising global popularity and its ability to monetize that growth, and (3) a preference for contracted revenues (defensive growth) given the current macroeconomic uncertainty.

**F1 continued to see its popularity rise in 2022, especially in the US:** The bull case on F1, in our view, includes exponentially increasing its earnings in the world's largest media market - the US - over the long term. Despite cord-cutting lowering pay-TV distribution by 15-20% since 2017, F1 linear ratings in the US were up ~15% on a CAGR basis during this time frame and nearly 20% in '22 vs. '21. Globally, F1 saw a cumulative TV audience of 1.54bn or 70mm per race on average last year.

**We see premium multiple on FWONK shares persisting:** F1's growth outlook (10-15% adjusted EBITDA CAGR through 2026, on our estimates), contracted nature of its business model (its primary F1 revenues are almost entirely built on multi-year contracts), and its high FCF conversion (~80% of adjusted F1 OpCo EBITDA converted to FCF in '22) support a premium multiple.


**Las Vegas Grand Prix a potential catalyst for shares:** As the promoter in Las Vegas, F1's economics are different relative to the rest of the calendar. While we do not see Liberty pursuing a promoter position across the entire F1 race calendar, we see both direct and indirect benefits to F1's earnings power from success in Vegas.

## Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$80




# Linde (LIN)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Linde PLC vs. Sector Peers

	Linde PLC percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR			11.7%				14.1%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					4.5%		3.3%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA			11.9%				11.3%
EBIT margin					25.3%		15.8%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E					24.7x		13.6x
EV/EBIT					20.8x		12.0x
P/FCF					32.2x		15.6x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA			1.3x				1.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Chemicals Industry View: Attractive

Vincent Andrews

**We view Linde as an underappreciated self-help story, backstopped by visible EPS growth, pricing power, and balance sheet flexibility.** Linde stands to benefit from regional margin parity, with an opportunity to close the ~200 bps margin gap between its APAC/EMEA and Americas segments (see [HERE](#) for more details). While parity is partially macro-dependent, Linde maintains control over most key margin improvement initiatives, including pricing and cost optimization. The company also continues to see margin expansion in the Americas, thereby raising the bar for APAC/EMEA parity. To that end, we believe self-help is further supported by: (1) visible EPS growth tied to take-or-pay capex; (2) through-the-cycle pricing power; and (3) an under-levered balance sheet (2023e net debt-to-EBITDA of 1.2x) positioned for deployment into growth capex and/or share repurchases.

Linde also screens as an attractive ESG 'Rate of Change' opportunity. In terms of green/blue hydrogen, Linde has been less active to date compared to peer Air Products from a large-scale project perspective. We believe this translates to higher marginal utility for the next dollar of green/blue capex announced at Linde versus Air Products. Likewise, we expect any Linde project to come with a more traditional industrial gas onsite structure (i.e., take or pay, automatic cost pass through, et al.) as was the case in its \$1.8B long-term hydrogen/ASU agreement with OCI.

**Linde also screens as an attractive ESG 'Rate of Change' opportunity.**


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## Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$365




# Lululemon Athletica (LULU)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

	Lululemon Athletica Inc.					Peer median	
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					16.1%		10.6%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					13.1%		4.1%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA					65.9%		21.9%
EBIT margin					23.1%		7.4%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E					25.0x		12.3x
EV/EBIT					16.2x		9.0x
P/FCF					22.7x		16.2x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA							1.2x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Specialty Retail Industry View: In-Line

Alex Straton

**LULU stands out for its balanced LT growth oppty, best-in-class margin profile, higher-income customer exposure, & thoughtful int'l strategy.** 4 key attributes set LULU apart from Softlines peers. (1) Consistent, outsized top-line & market share growth potential fueled by global geographical expansion, broader & deeper category penetration, and best-in-class product innovation. (2) Materially higher OM than peers (e.g., low-20s%+ vs. peer avg. MSD-HSD%) due to higher prices, largely core assortment mix, and low relative discounting activity. (3) Greater higher-income customer skew, providing some insulation from the turbulent macro. (4) Thoughtful approach to int'l expansion (including localized assortments, robust testing, & methodical store growth, among others).

**Top-line growth should outpace already-strong athleisure growth, & profitability should consistently improve over time.** The activewear market is expected to grow at a +MSD-HSD CAGR thru '26e, above apparel at +LSD. Importantly, not only is LULU likely to benefit from this industry growth, we believe its unique & innovative product assortment & category expansion is likely to generate ongoing market share gains, enabling an above market-growth rate MT. Further, we expect consistent EBIT dollar growth as LULU scales across geographies & categories. Taken together, LULU's ability to take share in an attractive category, coupled with EBIT dollar growth, likely enables consistent EPS growth & pushes shares higher LT.


Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$387






# MasterCard (MA)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

MasterCard Inc vs. Sector Peers

	MasterCard Inc					Peer median	
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					16.6%		14.6%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					13.3%		11.0%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA					78.9%		14.1%
EBIT margin					58.1%		19.0%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E					28.5x		17.0x
EV/EBIT					22.8x		15.9x
P/FCF					26.7x		16.9x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA	0.1x						1.3x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Payments and Processing Industry View: Attractive

James Faucette

**One of the best business models we've seen:** As the second-largest global card network (behind Visa), MA looks well positioned to benefit from market share gains in particular regions and consumer spending trends, which have been resilient even through economic cycles. Similar to V, MA should benefit from the return of cross-border travel, which is still below the pre-Covid trend-line and comes with higher-than-average yields.

**New fintech players are enabling, not disrupting, Networks:** Given MA's largely fixed cost base, it sees declining cost per transaction and steady uplift in operating margins as volume grows. This, along with its enhanced fraud capabilities and stickiness of consumer behavior, makes the threat of disruption from new entrants fairly low, in our view. Many of the new payment players tend to partner with MasterCard and operate on its rails, given MasterCard's competitive cost structure and moat. These partnerships with newcomers should continue to expand Mastercard's TAM in the P2P and B2B payment markets.


**B2B supports longer term opportunity:** MasterCard is likely to be a key player in the evolution of B2B payments over the next 3-10 years. Its solutions position it well to capture the ~\$40T of B2B flows (e.g. corporate cards, virtual cards, cross-border, accounts payable) as 45% of B2B payments are still made via checks. Many of these opportunities also can use card products and solutions that exist today, and do not require significant incremental investment.

## Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$438




# Microsoft (MSFT)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

Microsoft vs. Sector Peers	Microsoft	Peer median
percentile range (vs. sector peers)		
<b>Growth</b>		
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	18.4%	23.8%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	14.6%	14.6%
<b>Returns</b>		
RNOA	64.7%	59.0%
EBIT margin	41.5%	27.0%
<b>Valuation</b>		
P/E	29.6x	30.1x
EV/EBIT	23.1x	23.1x
P/FCF	31.4x	29.7x
<b>Leverage</b>		
Net Debt/EBITDA		1.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Software Industry View: Attractive

Keith Weiss

**Exceptional secular growth exposure...** Durability of Growth, Margin Expansion, and Capital Return. With over 70% of revenue derived from Commercial businesses and over 95% of Commercial revenue being recurring in nature (mostly ratable subscription revenue or term-based licenses associated with multi-year Enterprise License Agreements), growth is driven by strong commercial demand pools, powered by strong secular tailwinds and accompanied by attractive unit economics. According to our [CIO Survey](#), CIOs expect Microsoft to be the leading budget share gainer as workloads shift to the cloud over the next 3 years. Strong survey results are a reflection of Microsoft's strong positioning as a beneficiary of key secular trends and CIO priorities across AI/ML, Cloud, Security, Analytics and Digital Transformation. The accelerating pace of innovation around adding AI-powered capabilities into the portfolio with announcements including Microsoft 365 Copilot, Github Copilot, New Bing, and more, support momentum across the business and buttress durable growth.


**...at an exceptional price.** With a medium-term view, double-digit top-line growth (supported by secular tailwinds, easing compares, price increases, & waning FX headwinds) outpaces COGS growth to deliver mid-teens gross profit dollar growth. Prudent opex spend and focus on efficiency at scale drives mid-to-high teens operating income growth. Share repurchases and a dividend yield push the total return profile to high-teens. With Microsoft on a path to deliver 5 quarters of accelerating EPS growth from the Q2 trough, we see an opportunity to accumulate MSFT shares, which are significantly undervalued at current levels, in our view.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$307




# Motorola Solutions (MSI)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Motorola Solutions Inc vs. Sector Peers

	Motorola Solutions Inc percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				11.4%		
Sales '23-'25 CAGR				5.5%		
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA						40.5%
EBIT margin				27.1%		17.8%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E						23.7x
EV/EBIT						19.3x
P/FCF				27.7x		21.8x
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA				1.4x		1.3x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Telecom & Networking Equip. Industry View: Cautious

Meta Marshall

**Dominant radio market position.** MSI has a dominant market share in radios, a defensive exposure given the segment's ties to government spending. Land mobile radio (LMR) accounts for the vast majority of revenue (~77% in 2022) and MSI maintains ~40%+ share of this ~\$11bn+ mission-critical TAM. With the LMR / push-to-talk market expected to grow for several years and high barriers to entry given LMR's mission-critical nature, we believe MSI has an attractive competitive position in its core market. We also favor MSI's ability to optimize around this market position (i.e., consistently expanding operating margins Y/Y) and generate cash to fund share repurchases / dividends.

**TAM expansion opportunities bolster competitive positioning.** We see a path toward long-term re-rating via MSI leveraging cash flow generation and its footprint in LMR/command center into winning in next-generation public safety tech, including video security. We estimate end markets within Video are higher-growth than LMR and should accelerate MSI's growth as the segment becomes larger in the overall revenue mix (with tailwinds from displacement of offerings from China). Advancements within LMR (APX Next portfolio) should create holistic secular tailwinds for growth. Overall, more investment in security by schools, public places, and workplaces broaden investment in MSI products.


**Compelling longer-term software story offers additional upside.** MSI has invested in a more robust command center software platform to build on its leading share in 911. Increasing use of analytics software for video surveillance use cases should support the software portfolio.

Risk Reward: Equal-Weight / Price Target \$260




# MSCI Inc. (MSCI)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

MSCI Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	MSCI Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)	Peer median
<b>Growth</b>		
EPS '23-'25 CAGR	17.6%	13.7%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR	12.1%	7.0%
<b>Returns</b>		
RNOA	46.0%	20.2%
<b>Valuation</b>		
P/E	40.3x	31.7x
P/B		9.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e. (P/B could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Business & Education Services Industry View: In-Line

Toni Kaplan

**Strong competitive advantages.** MSCI is a leading provider of benchmark indices, portfolio analytics, and ESG research for investment institutions. MSCI has an attractive business model with a scalable infrastructure, recurring revenue, and a strong brand name. MSCI's business model is extremely scalable – once an index product is developed, little further capital investment is required. As a result, MSCI has the highest EBITDA margins within our subscription-based Information Services coverage (60% vs. 43% avg), and we expect margins to expand going forward driven by operational leverage and strong expense management.

**MSCI operates in the highly attractive index industry** with "must-have" data sets, pricing power, and operational leverage. The index industry benefits from a network effect and high switching costs. Once a fund manager selects an MSCI index to use as a benchmark, it is disruptive to change it, which promotes stickiness. Strong brand recognition, large ecosystems surrounding flagship indices, and frictions make it difficult or costly for asset managers to switch benchmarks. Strong tailwinds in the index industry and execution have led to the highest expected organic growth rate in '24 within our coverage (12% vs. 7.5%)


**MSCI is the leading provider of ESG/climate content and indices** with significant market share. MSCI benefits from having a first mover advantage and continues to invest heavily in the space to maintain its leading position. MSCI has 55% share of US ESG ETFs vs. 13% for the next largest competitor due to its significant head start.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$543




# NextEra Energy (NEE)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

NextEra Energy Inc vs. Sector Peers

	NextEra Energy Inc					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						9.2%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						6.7%
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA					6.5%	5.7%
EBIT margin					32.2%	20.9%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E					24.4x	17.4x
EV/EBIT					26.3x	19.6x
P/FCF			(38.1x)			(23.5x)
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA			5.1x			5.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Diversified Utilities / IPPs Industry View: Attractive

David Arcaro


### Highly differentiated, sustainable competitive position in the renewables market.

This US developer of wind, solar, and storage assets benefits from economies of scale that offer the company buying power in the supply chain, improved transmission interconnect positions, operating cost efficiency, and robust access to debt and tax equity capital. NEE has a very long track record in the industry, building long-term customer relationships with repeat buyers and a reputation for strong execution. The company's large existing asset base offers improved market and geographic knowledge of wind/solar resources. And the next key area for differentiation is in software and analytics, with internal software capabilities to integrate complex storage assets, offer sophisticated predictive maintenance, optimize site design and power output, and map out customer generation portfolios and decarbonization targets to better tailor products.

### New growth opportunities with attractive returns and wide moats stemming from the Inflation Reduction Act.


Storage, green hydrogen, and renewables repowering are set to benefit from new lucrative tax credits that unlock large growth opportunities for new infrastructure. We see prospects for NextEra to be among the leaders in building out these new markets and capturing attractive low-risk returns.

### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$97




# Nike (NKE)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Nike Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Nike Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)				Peer median		
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						28.1%	10.6%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						11.1%	4.1%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						38.4%	21.9%
EBIT margin						13.1%	7.4%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E						29.7x	12.3x
EV/EBIT						24.5x	9.0x
P/FCF						44.2x	16.2x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA	0.0x						1.2x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Branded Apparel & Footwear Industry View: In-Line

Alex Straton

### NKE's DTC acceleration makes it one of the best-positioned Softlines companies in the post-Covid era, in our view.

While we believe NKE remains in the early stages of its transition from a traditional wholesaler to a digitally-led direct to consumer (DTC) business, it has made impressive progress so far, increasing DTC penetration by ~10 pts since 2019 (from 30% to ~40%). This DTC-first approach enhances NKE's LT market share, revenue, margin, & EPS growth opportunity, making it one of the highest-growth consumer names as well as one of the few to benefit from the move to digital (~23% of '22 revenue vs. NKE's ~40% LT target).

### The shift to DTC should materially improve NKE's financial profile.

Given its strong commitment to a DTC-first approach, we expect NKE to continue to allocate its best SKUs and focus its marketing efforts on DTC, leading the most profitable customers to the channel. Therefore, not only do we expect the DTC strategy to drive revenue growth as NKE recognizes the full wholesale to retail markup for itself, but it should also improve profitability. We estimate a ~10 point uplift to GM, which mgmt. expects to flow through to the operating profit line as the business scales.

### Strong activewear growth & favorable secular trends should further support NKE's LT growth.

Additionally, trends such as (1) the activewear market outgrowing general footwear & apparel, (2) increased consumer focus on health & wellness, & (3) the ongoing casualization of fashion, should further bolster NKE's LT growth opportunity.


### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$140






# Northrop Grumman (NOC)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

	Northrop Grumman Corp. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					17.3%		13.6%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					8.7%		7.0%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA				12.4%			12.1%
EBIT margin		10.6%					12.8%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E				20.0x			20.0x
EV/EBIT				18.9x			18.2x
P/FCF						34.2x	24.7x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA				1.9x			1.8x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Defense Industry View: Attractive

Kristine Liwag

**A winning portfolio.** Northrop Grumman (NOC) went from Dark Horse of the Prime pack to the long-term Defense name to own after winning two generational programs – the B-21 bomber and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile. These two franchises offer decades of earnings visibility for NOC and will serve as the backbone of the US nuclear deterrent. The 2018 acquisition of Orbital ATK also helped NOC round out an end-to-end Space portfolio (~35% of total revenue) that is unrivaled, in our view, by peers. With its B-21 and Sentinel wins and continued Pentagon investment in the Space domain (~20% YoY growth in FY24 budget request / ~22% trailing 5-year CAGR), we see NOC’s portfolio particularly well-aligned to current and emerging Defense Department priorities (for more, see [Generational Investments in Defense](#)). We see Defense in the early inning of an upcycle fueled by a deteriorating global security environment and pressing Pentagon modernization requirements – both of which should provide strong tailwinds for NOC’s business.


**Peer-high growth.** NOC’s strong portfolio alignment, in our view, should drive peer-high growth through 2025 (~7.5% CAGR 2022-25e). We also expect a ~29% FCF CAGR through 2025 as Section 174 headwinds ease and capex moderates after an elevated investment period driven by significant new program wins. NOC plans to return >100% of FCF to shareholders in 2023 and we expect the management team – which we view as best-in-class – to continue to run its shareholder-friendly capital deployment playbook at least through mid-decade.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$601




# Old Dominion Freight Line (ODFL)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Old Dominion Freight Line Inc vs. Sector Peers

	Old Dominion Freight Line Inc					Peer median	
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				9.4%			10.5%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						6.5%	4.5%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						38.1%	15.4%
EBIT margin						29.0%	10.0%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E						27.2x	14.8x
EV/EBIT						19.8x	12.2x
P/FCF						40.3x	14.6x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA							1.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Freight Transportation Industry View: In-Line

Ravi Shanker

**We view ODFL as a best-in-class franchise across Freight Transportation, if not a wider sample set.** Very few companies can match ODFL's 15+ year track record of growing revenues at a 10%+ CAGR (4x+ GDP), while improving margins 1500 bp (with op. margins now topping 30%) to drive EPS growth CAGR of 20%+. The stock has been one of the best performing in the S&P 500 in that period (up over 3,600% since 2008), as the company solidifies its position amongst investors as a "core holding".

**The best house on a rapidly improving block.** While the cyclicality and industry dynamics of Trucking may initially give some investors pause, we have been structurally positive on Trucking for a while. A number of structural catalysts including new regulations in the last 5 years (that have introduced barriers to entry in the business for the first time), share gains from other transportation modes (supply chains getting shorter, faster, and tighter favors Trucking), industry consolidation as well as long term favorable structural shifts like nearshoring, electrification, and autonomous trucking, are driving compounding earnings growth in the space. As the best house on this block, ODFL is very well positioned, in our view.


**Deeply Entrenched Strengths.** ODFL's key strengths include being in the sweet spot of scale, owning more of their real estate footprint than peers, investing in growth through the cycle and exceptional management, that drives ODFL's best-in-class track record.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$340




# Prologis (PLD)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Prologis, Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Prologis, Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
FFO '23-'25 CAGR							2.5%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR							2.8%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA				4.2%			3.9%
EBIT margin				40.1%			33.1%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/FFO						21.2x	11.6x
EV/EBITDA						22.0x	14.7x
P/FCF							12.4x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA	3.8x						5.7x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Real Estate Investment Trusts Industry View: In-Line

Ronald Kamdem

**Low industrial availability rates combined with below-market rents within the portfolio creates LT visibility in PLD's internal growth algorithm.** Leases within the portfolio remain ~70% below market rents, driving our expectation for average internal growth of 8-10% over the next several years. In addition, PLD's favorable balance sheet (~5x debt to EBITDA, ~20% leverage ratio) and strategic capital business provide the company with a sustainable path for external growth.

**Due to high barriers to supply and elevated e-commerce demand, PLD's markets are at record lows in terms of available space.** The company's markets have experienced between 15-30% market rent growth since '18, creating a favorable spread between embedded rents within PLD's portfolio current market rents (lease terms are ~7 years, and only 10-15% of leases are rolled to market per year). This backdrop has led to runway of "built in" same store growth over the next several years and we expect 8-10% internal NOI growth through '26.


**Favorable supply/demand dynamics should insulate PLD from a slowing macro backdrop.** While we expect the pace of market rent growth to slow as inventory growth slows and speculative supply (future deliveries that are not pre-leased) comes online, our analysis suggests rent growth can remain positive in the intermediate term, as both slowing demand and record supply pipelines may not be enough to push availability rates close to the 8-9% range where market rent growth historically turned negative (see Exhibit 1 of [Dissecting Risks to Fundamentals: Resume PLD at OW; Top Pick](#)).

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$128




# Raytheon Technologies (RTX)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Raytheon Technologies Corp vs. Sector Peers

	Raytheon Technologies Corp					Peer median
	percentile range (vs. sector peers)					
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					19.1%	13.1%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR			7.7%			7.4%
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA		6.5%				12.1%
EBIT margin			12.1%			12.5%
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E			19.1x			20.0x
EV/EBIT				19.1x		18.2x
P/FCF				29.1x		22.9x
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA			2.3x			1.8x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Defense Industry View: Attractive

Kristine Liwag

**We continue to see RTX as a value play given exposure to aerospace and defense end markets, along with strong FCF generation.** We see the commercial aero business benefitting from China re-opening and OEM rate ramps. China re-opening should help to drive the next leg up for commercial aftermarket at Collins as Asia/Pacific air traffic remained at ~57% of pre-Covid levels in December. OEM rate ramps for the Boeing 737 MAX from ~31/month today to ~50/month in 2025/2026 and A320neo family from ~45-50/month today to ~65/month by the end of 2024 will help drive further upside for commercial aerospace.


**RTX's defense business should benefit from a strong macro backdrop for defense spending as a heightened geopolitical climate persists** (see more in [Generational Investments in Defense](#)). We see higher defense spending providing a multi-year growth outlook, though see this growth taking time to materialize and acknowledge short-term supply chain disruptions. RTX is positioned well for growing areas of the Defense Budget as highlighted by the recent FY24 budget request featuring Space funding request up 20% YoY and Missiles/Missile funding request up 23% YoY. We also see RTX benefitting from the Air Force's decision to upgrade existing F-35 engines instead of developing a new engine. We estimate the company will generate \$7.9bn in 2023, \$7.2bn in 2024, and \$9.4bn in 2025.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$115




# Thermo Fisher Scientific (TMO)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

Sector Yardsticks		Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. vs. Sector Peers				Peer median		
		percentile range (vs. sector peers)						
		0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>								
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				13.1%				16.2%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR				8.0%				9.0%
<b>Returns</b>								
RNOA								13.6%
EBIT margin				23.9%				23.9%
<b>Valuation</b>								
P/E				23.1x				21.8x
EV/EBIT					22.3x			21.4x
P/FCF				23.9x				22.5x
<b>Leverage</b>								
Net Debt/EBITDA					1.9x			1.4x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Life Science Tools & Diagnostics Industry View: In-Line

Tejas Savant

**Best-in-class resiliency.** We like TMO for the breadth of its portfolio, diversified customer base and scale - attributes that we believe will prove advantageous in navigating a potential recession, in addition to inflationary pressures and geopolitical uncertainty. TMO's favorable end market exposure, PPI business system, and track record of consistent all-weather execution underpin our confidence in management's long-term core organic growth target of 7-9% with mid-teens EPS growth.

**Well positioned to outpace peers and end markets.** As a global life sciences leader, TMO serves ~\$165B in addressable markets (across diagnostics & healthcare, industrial/applied, academic/government, and pharma & biotech) that have historically grown in the 4-6% range annually. We firmly believe in TMO's ability to outgrow its peers and end markets driven by a combination of increasing exposure to high-growth verticals (specifically biopharma, following the Patheon/PPD acquisitions) and geographies (including China), as well as a relentless focus on share gains fueled by the breadth, depth and reach of their portfolio.


**Embedded M&A optionality.** The thesis comes with embedded capital deployment optionality, given management's successful track record of consolidation in the fragmented tools sector and their commitment to M&A (with plans to deploy \$48B in capital from 2023-25, with 65% allocated to acquisitions).

## Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$670




# T-Mobile US (TMUS)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

	T-Mobile US, Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR						30.6%	4.2%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR						4.1%	1.1%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						8.7%	5.9%
EBIT margin					20.4%		17.1%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E				20.2x			21.2x
EV/EBIT		14.4x					17.5x
P/FCF				13.0x			13.0x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA	2.5x						3.5x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Telecom Services Industry View: In-Line

Simon Flannery

### 5G leadership and differentiated growth drivers supporting share gains and category expansion.

T-Mobile's Sprint merger drove early success in 5G with the company able to sustain a 1-2 year lead vs peers, while also benefiting from ~25% more low/mid-band spectrum. The company has a clear growth strategy predicated primarily on share gains in key, underpenetrated markets: small town/rural, enterprise and top 100 market network seekers. Additionally, T-Mobile has led the way on fixed wireless home broadband as a brand new market opportunity for the company that's expected to scale to 7-8mn subs by 2025.

### Ongoing margin upside on remaining synergy realization and scale gains.

The integration of the Sprint merger will be complete in 2023 with management recently raising synergy guidance to \$8bn from \$7.5bn previously and \$6bn realized in 2022. Ongoing synergy realization and growing scale should allow the company to expand EBITDA service margins to the mid-50% range over the long-term vs. 43% in 2022.

### Just starting to execute on up to \$60bn in buybacks through 2025.

The company has laid out plans to repurchase up to \$60bn in stock through 2025. With leverage already close to the mid-2x target range, an initial \$14bn program was authorized in late-2022, and we're expecting a new, larger program to be announced later this year.


### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$175






# UnitedHealth Group (UNH)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

UnitedHealth Group Inc vs. Sector Peers

	UnitedHealth Group Inc percentile range (vs. sector peers)				Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100
<b>Growth</b>						
EPS '23-'25 CAGR					13.1%	
Sales '23-'25 CAGR			8.4%			
<b>Returns</b>						
RNOA					26.3%	
EBIT margin					8.9%	
<b>Valuation</b>						
P/E					18.4x	
EV/EBIT					13.8x	
P/FCF				15.5x		
<b>Leverage</b>						
Net Debt/EBITDA			0.5x			

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Healthcare Facilities & Managed Care Ind. View: In-Line

Erin Wright

### Healthcare's Most Scaled and Diversified Services

**Company.** In health insurance, scale is king and UNH is the largest national insurer with top-three position in almost all insurance end markets. We believe the resiliency of UNH's diversified businesses across Health Insurance (UnitedHealthcare), Health Provider (OptumCare), Pharmacy Services (OptumRx), and Data Analytics (OptumInsight) will generate long-term double-digit earnings growth with high visibility as a best-in-class vertically integrated MCO in a highly defensive category.

**Leader in the Medicare Advantage Segment.** With preeminent Medicare Advantage (MA) market share nearing ~30% and MA growing mid to high-single-digits annually, UNH should continue to benefit from its superior competitive positioning, well-poised to drive outsized MA membership growth and thereby outperformance in 2023 and beyond.


**The Unique Optum Opportunity.** UNH's diversified Optum unit (57% of revenue, 49% of operating profit) sets it apart from peers. This segment delivers high-quality growth across inherently less regulated areas of healthcare and is the conduit that cultivates synergies across its diverse businesses. More specifically, its OptumCare sub-segment has expanded its reach into value-based care, while OptumRx (a top-3 PBM) will benefit from near-term biosimilar launches, and OptumInsight is a leader in healthcare technology assets / data analytics, growing double-digits. We expect it to bolster its offerings over time, further supplementing growth.

### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$587




# Visa (V)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

### Sector Yardsticks

Visa Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Visa Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				14.4%			14.6%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR				11.9%			11.0%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA						37.2%	14.1%
EBIT margin						67.9%	19.0%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E					25.4x		17.0x
EV/EBIT					20.7x		15.9x
P/FCF					26.5x		16.9x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA							1.3x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Payments and Processing Industry View: Attractive

James Faucette

**Visa runs one of the largest centralized consumer payment networks globally**, processing US\$11.6tr in payment volume in FY22. Its low-cost network, significant operating leverage, and enhanced risk detection capabilities enable it to price competitively vs. new players. Visa is presently operating at scale, while any new market entrants need to balance low network fees (to remain attractive vs. Visa) with continued investment in their platforms, high costs to drive user growth, and limited benefits of scale. This means that Visa is well-positioned to underprice competitors to retain market share globally, if needed.

**Visa is a key beneficiary of resilient consumer spending worldwide and consumers' / businesses' ongoing migration from cash to electronic payments.** Trends toward digitization (mCommerce and eCommerce) over the years should allow Visa's growth to outpace overall global PCE growth, while any rise in inflation should serve as a tailwind to the business, with ~2/3 of revenue tied to volumes. The continuation of the cross-border-travel recovery, still not beyond the pre-Covid trend line, will also benefit Visa given its higher-than-average yields.


**B2B payments represent a large untapped market for Visa**, where innovation has significantly lagged the consumer payments market with an estimated ~45% of B2B payments still made via checks. Increasing investment in modernizing B2B payments opens up a new large TAM for Visa, as it finds new applications for Visa Direct and its other offerings. We think the electrification of payments and B2B should be enough to support double-digit compounding earnings growth for Visa, driving mid-teens returns in coming years.

Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$288




# Yum! Brands (YUM)

## Value of Growth Analysis



## Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) Analysis



## Sector Yardsticks

**Sector Yardsticks**  
Yum! Brands, Inc. vs. Sector Peers

	Yum! Brands, Inc. percentile range (vs. sector peers)					Peer median	
	0	20	40	60	80	100	
<b>Growth</b>							
EPS '23-'25 CAGR				15.1%			15.1%
Sales '23-'25 CAGR					8.0%		6.7%
<b>Returns</b>							
RNOA							74.4%
EBIT margin							32.8%
<b>Valuation</b>							
P/E				25.2x			25.2x
EV/EBIT			19.9x				20.1x
P/FCF				27.2x			27.2x
<b>Leverage</b>							
Net Debt/EBITDA					4.9x		4.4x

Note: Sector Yardstick metrics - Returns: 2023e; Valuation: 2023e; Leverage 2023e. (Net Debt/EBITDA and P/FCF could be NM) Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Restaurants Industry View: In-Line

Brian Harbour

### A globally diversified, multi-brand fast food franchisor.

YUM's portfolio includes KFC, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and the Habit Burger Grill, with 98% of its 55k+ stores franchised, across 155+ countries. YUM is one of few globally scaled and diversified operators we think can sustain close to 6% store growth and high-single-digit system sales growth over the next several years, driving low- to mid-teens EPS growth. YUM's franchised model is among the most asset-light, cash generative, and offers lower earnings volatility.

**Better prospects for sustaining higher unit growth:** While 5% global unit growth is the new target vs. 4% prior, YUM is running ~6% today with solid execution evident over the past 2 years in a tough environment. 15+ int'l franchisees are publicly listed, well capitalized, and relatively consolidated, which underlies this growth and diversifies it beyond mainly China. Taco Bell Int'l should be an accelerating source of growth and KFC is fast growing in emerging markets.

**Brand and franchisee strength is higher than in prior downturns:** KFC and Pizza Hut US have been shrinking brands in the US but are on better footing today. Broadly, brand positioning, menu, and store footprints are in better shape and digital channels are built out, helping KFC and PH compete in any economic environment and any country.

**Sales drivers include China, digital expansion:** China, almost 10% of revenue, was a drag on sales in '22, but should be a tailwind from here. Much of YUM's newer digital tools are just at the point of scaling and beginning to drive sales / franchisee profits. As a multi-brand operator with leading scale, few companies can invest in these in a similar fashion.

### Risk Reward: Overweight / Price Target \$155



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STOCK RATING CATEGORY	COVERAGE UNIVERSE		INVESTMENT BANKING CLIENTS (IBC)			OTHER MATERIAL INVESTMENT SERVICES CLIENTS (MISC)	
	COUNT	% OF TOTAL	COUNT	% OF TOTAL IBC	% OF RATING CATEGORY	COUNT	% OF OTHER MISC
<b>Overweight/Buy</b>	<b>1353</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>Equal-weight/Hold</b>	<b>1664</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>47%</b>
<b>Not-Rated/Hold</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>
<b>Underweight/Sell</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>15%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,681</b>		<b>658</b>			<b>1557</b>	

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